Attempts have been made in the empirical literature to identify credit rationing and its determinants using balance sheet data or evidence from corporate surveys. However, observational equivalence, identification problems, and interview biases are serious problems in these studies. We analyze directly the determinants of credit rationing in credit files by examining the difference between the amounts demanded by and supplied to each borrower, as shown by official bank records. Our findings provide microeconomic evidence that supports the credit view hypothesis by showing that the European Central Bank refinancing rate is significantly and positively related to partial (but not total) credit rationing. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that this variable affects the total volume of bank loans.
THE DRIVERS OF credit rationing and the validity of the credit view-that central bank policy rates affect the supply of bank loans-are important factors for study because credit constraints or lower aggregate loan volumes can curb firms' investment plans. As firms often do not have sufficient internal resources to finance their own production entirely, credit rationing can have a serious effect on their success. On the aggregate level, this can result in lower overall economic growth.
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The banking literature identifies two signals that credit rationing is occurring. The first is stickiness of loan rates (or bank credit margins) with respect to changes in base rates. A major contribution on this subject was made by Berger and Udell (1992) , who, using a sample of more than one million individual loans in the United States between 1977 and 1988, find that bank margins are sticky with respect to shifts in nominal treasury rates. The slow adjustment they observe is consistent with that found in earlier studies by Goldfeld (1966) , Jaffee (1971) , and Slovin and Sushka (1983) .
The second signal is that borrowers tend to switch to alternative sources of financing that are more expensive than the primary source (which is therefore assumed to be rationed). Sofianos, Wachtel, and Melnik (1990) find evidence that loan quantities, when free of commitment, 1 react to monetary policy and regard this response as a signal that quantity rationing is occurring. Berger and Udell (1992) also find that in the presence of credit rationing the proportion of loans used under commitment (not discretionary for the lender) falls by 1% when nominal rates of interest double.
2 This is contrary to the expectation that, in the presence of credit rationing, lenders would cut discretionary lending during credit crunches. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Harhoff and Körting (1998) use another specific property of loan contracts as a proxy for credit rationing: fast payment discounts that a firm takes as a proportion of the total available. Firms that do not exploit opportunities for fast payment discounts de facto switch to a more expensive source of lending and are viewed as rationed with regard to their primary lender (a bank).
If the credit rationing theory looks at the problem of availability of credit at micro level, the credit view looks at it from an aggregate point of view and seeks to identify "a set of factors that amplify and propagate conventional interest rate effects" (Bernanke and Gertler 1995, p. 28) . 3 The main difference between the credit view and the standard IS-LM "money view" is that the former holds that adjustment in the presence of changes in monetary policies occurs not only on the money demand (and bond demand) side, but also through a restriction of credit (the credit supply side).
There are several possible reasons that this occurs. First, the standard Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection and moral hazard rationale may apply, and banks may become more reluctant to satisfy borrowers' demands in order to avoid an increase in loan risk. Second, credit tightening may be related to a balance sheet effect (Bernanke and Blinder 1992) : higher interest rates worsen the financial position of leveraged firms by increasing the cost of their preexisting (flexible interest rate) 1 . Loans under commitment in the United States protect borrowers against credit rationing in the short run, albeit at considerable cost, because they include a clause that allows the borrower to obtain additional credit (without further review) at the current loan rate. The increase in volume of such loans in general, and especially when credit conditions get tighter, is regarded as reflecting a desire to avoid quantity rationing of the cheaper credit source (loans not under commitment).
2. Using an empirical approach similar to that of Berger and Udell (1992) but with original information on borrower risk, Cowling (2010) finds that a UK government loan guarantee scheme alleviates credit rationing.
3. Evidence in favor of the credit view is provided by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , Anari et al. (2002) , and Suzuki (2004). debt and reducing the net present value of their (collateralizable) assets. Third, if credit tightening narrows the gap between the loan and refinancing rate (or between the loan and government bond rates), bank lending activity becomes less rewarding. Fourth, monetary tightening may cause a contraction in capital adequacy ratios, thereby, inducing banks to reduce lending.
The difference between the first and second rationales above is subtle. Banks may ration either because they are afraid of selecting intrinsically riskier projects in the presence of higher loan rates or because they realize that the worsening of the balance sheet position makes investors more prone to take risks, irrespective of the intrinsic risk of their projects.
However, in the credit rationing and credit view literature, the testing of hypotheses is often compromised by problems of observational equivalence, identification problems, and interview bias. 4 Researchers tend to encounter such problems when conducting standard balance sheet-and/or survey-based empirical analyses. By contrast, the most relevant empirical analyses of credit rationing directly examine the behavior of banks and do not rely on the theoretical assumptions in the cash flow/investment literature (for a review of critical issues in this approach, see Schiantarelli 1995) .
Furthermore, most empirical studies of the credit view consider aggregate evidence for the significance of the relationship between loan volumes and central bank policy rates. Two typical problems affecting such analyses of aggregate data are identification and the direction of causality. By outlining a "supply versus demand puzzle," Bernanke (1993) correctly points out that when we observe a significant negative relationship between policy rate and volume of loans, we cannot distinguish whether the change in the equilibrium volume of loans disbursed by the banking system results from a demand or supply effect (see also Suzuki 2004) .
In the present study, we seek to overcome these problems by using direct evidence from official bank records of individual loan levels. These data indicate (i) whether borrowers received an amount of credit lower than that requested at a given lending rate or (ii) whether borrowers were refused credit entirely. Obtaining loan data with credit rationing information directly from official bank records allows us to measure credit rationing on the supply side by focusing on the difference between the amount requested and that financed by the bank. Hence, if we find evidence of a significant relationship between policy rates and rationing decisions, we defuse a typical objection to the credit view: namely, that the financial system is passive and only responds to investors' demand.
4. The three major sources of such bias are the interviewer (prejudices or desire to ask leading questions), the respondent (who may lie or evade questions), and the actual physical, and social setting of the interview. An example of the second is the Hawthorne Effect (Landsberger 1958) or the biases in measuring willingness to pay for public goods, as surveyed by Carson and Mitchell (1989) and Diamond and Hausman (1994) . An example of the third source is in papers (such as that of Schwarz and Clore 1983) on the effect of weather conditions in life satisfaction inquiries. In empirical papers on credit rationing based on survey data, researchers rely on respondents' answers about partial and credit rationing, using as a check the dynamics of some balance sheet data (investment, cash flow). Such answers are therefore subject to interview bias.
Finally, it should be noted that bank loans are imperfectly substitutable with other financing instruments, which is a crucial hypothesis of the credit view. As shown in the following sections, this is especially true in our sample, which mainly includes as borrowers small firms and cooperatives, nonprofit firms, and associations that may find it difficult to receive alternative financing instruments on the financial markets. This characteristic adds further interest to our study, because to our knowledge there are no empirical studies on the credit view and credit rationing that focus on bank lending to such firms. More specifically, the bank whose data we use in the study, Banca Etica, is a multistakeholder-oriented, nonprofit-maximizing bank. 5 The choice of Banca Popolare Etica gives generality to our results in the relatively underresearched field of behavior among nonprofit-maximizing financial institutions.
The next section of the present paper, Section 1, illustrates characteristics and relevance of nonprofit-maximizing banks and provides a simple theoretical argument showing that in general, although such banks pursue different goals from those of commercial banks, they exhibit very similar behavior in terms of credit rationing and attitude toward project risk. Section 2 then illustrates and comments on the descriptive findings. Section 3 presents the econometric findings and analyzes in detail the effects of borrower type, credit type characteristics, and macroeconomic variables on credit rationing. Section 4 presents conclusions.
CHARACTERISTICS AND RELEVANCE OF NONPROFIT-MAXIMIZING BANKS
Nonprofit-maximizing banks play a substantial role in financial systems. In the Italian banking industry, they account for market shares of 33.7% of deposits and 29.5% of loan volumes. In terms of branches, they represent 60% of the total in France, 50% in Austria, and about 40% in Germany, and the Netherlands. In 2007, EU cooperative banks held an average market share of 25% in terms of loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), while an average of 29% of their loans were issued to SMEs (Bongini and Ferri 2007) .
At the global level, financial cooperatives serve more than 621 million people in the G-20 nations alone, "provide US$3.6 trillion in loans, hold US$4.4 trillion in savings, and have US$7.6 trillion in total assets." 6 The highest ranking cooperative bank in terms of shareholder equity among the top 50 in 2008 was Crédit Agricole, 5. The bank declares that it adopts the following principles of ethical finance: (i) ethically oriented finance shows awareness of the noneconomic consequences of economic actions; (ii) access to finance, in all its forms, is a human right; (iii) efficiency and prudence are components of ethical responsibility; (iv) profit produced by the ownership and exchange of money must derive from activities oriented toward the common good and must be equally distributed among all those that contribute to its realization; (v) the maximum transparency of all operations is one of the main conditions of all ethical finance activities; (vi) the active involvement of shareholders and savers in the company's decision-making process must be encouraged; and (vii) every organization that accepts and adheres to the principles of ethical finance undertakes to ground its entire activity on such principles.
6. From http://icba.free.fr/IMG/pdf/G_20_MARCH_09.pdf (accessed April 30, 2009). which ranked seventh, with other cooperative banks in positions ranging from 20th to 40th, among them Rabobank, Caisse d'Epargne, Banque Populaire, and Crédit Mutuel. As emphasized by Canning, Spencer, and Jefferson (2003) , even international institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund can be included in this group because in practice they act as nonprofit-maximizing financial institutions. Interest in nonprofit-maximizing banks among academics, policymakers, and readers has increased since the beginning of the global financial crisis, during which the specific characteristics of banks of this kind seemed to provide a degree of protection against the effects of the crisis in Italy and many other countries.
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The nonprofit-maximzing bank object of our inquiry, Banca Popolare Etica, is a banca popolare, and its statutes share the principles of the International Cooperative Bank Association (ICBA). 8 The ICBA includes among its members banche cooperative and banche popolari in Italy, building societies and credit unions in the United Kingdom, and mutual savings and loans and credit unions in the United States. In the section which follows we argue that, although nonprofit-maximizing banks differ from commercial banks in terms of their goals, they exhibit the same behavior in relation to credit rationing and attitude toward project risk, in terms of the proportion of admissible loans that fulfill minimum socio-environmental criteria. 
Nonprofit-Maximizing Banks and Credit Rationing
The main aim of commercial banks is to maximize profits. By contrast, nonprofitmaximizing banks aim to maximize the volume of performing loans that pass a socioenvironmental threshold (see also Canning, Spencer, and Jefferson 2003 on this point). However, nonprofit-maximizing banks are subject to the same capital adequacy constraints as commercial banks. Given the compulsory requirement for a bank to increase its reserves whenever a new nonperforming loan position emerges, the common rule of such constraints (in the United States and Europe) is the definition of the ratio between reserves plus equity capital and the volume of loans:
7. The ICBA (March 9, 2009) declared: "In this financial crisis, the cooperative banking business model, relying on democratic governance, member participation, proximity, and the satisfaction of its members and clients interests, showed its benefits as a factor of stability and financial security for millions of people. Indeed, cooperative banks have a long-term view and do not rely on the financial market to raise their capital: Their first aim is not to maximize profit for the benefit of their shareholders but to provide the best possible products and services to their members. The recent financial crisis proves that the cooperative banking business model is, more than ever, appropriate and relevant" (http://icba.free.fr/IMG/pdf/G_20_MARCH_09.pdf, accessed April 30, 2009).
8. According to the International Cooperative Alliance Statement of Cooperative Identity, a cooperative is "an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise. Cooperatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, cooperative members believe in the ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility, and caring for others."
9. The theoretical argument we present here is in contrast to that of Canning, Spencer, and Jefferson (2003) , who propose that nonprofit-maximizing banks introduce credit rationing to correct for the distortionary effect of subsidies.
where Rs are reserves, E is equity, Z is the total number of financed loans, and X is the policy ratio fixed by regulators. We assume here that this constraint is binding, because by maximizing credit volumes, nonprofit-maximizing banks find sufficient admissible loans and satisfy the constraint with equality; in the short run, they cannot relax this constraint with equity issues. Their attitude toward risk will therefore be the same as that of commercial banks for three reasons.
First, although it involves diminishing returns, the benefit of risk is that, as in the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) model, bank profits may be conveniently assumed to be concave in loan risk. Second, profits are accumulated into reserves and may slacken the capital adequacy constraint, thereby allowing NPM banks to increase credit volumes (their goal). Third, the drawback of greater risk is that it may increase the volume of nonperforming loans, leading in turn to an increase in reserves required with negative effects on the capital requirement ratio (and therefore on the maximum volume of loans that can be supplied).
To summarize, commercial banks may ration credit and fix a nonmarket-clearing lending rate that creates excess demand for loans because they know that a higher interest rate could create a moral hazard and adverse selection, thereby increasing risk and leading to nonmaximum profit (because bank profits do not monotonically increase with risk). The behavior of nonprofit-maximizing banks is observationally equivalent (nonmarket-clearing interest rates and credit rationing to avoid taking excessive risk) because the variable that they maximize (i.e., the volume of loans, thus creating economic, social, and environmental value) also increases nonmonotonically in project risk. This depends on the effects of risk on the capital adequacy constraint, as explained earlier. 10 In the empirical sections which follow we will evaluate whether, consistently with these theoretical considerations, and under which circumstances nonprofit-maximizing banks ration credit.
DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS
Our data set is taken from the body of loans disbursed to nonindividual borrowers by Banca Etica from 1999 (when it was founded) to July 2006. The available data include information on individual credit files and borrower characteristics from the bank's official records. To this information we have added data on relevant macroeconomic and financial variables taken from ISTAT (the Italian national statistics institute), the OECD, and the Bank of Italy. We therefore omit these variables from 10. Although this theoretical argument is much more general, we show its application to a specific theoretical framework using an adverse selection case in the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) model. The analytical results are available upon request on the authors' websites. our estimates. Descriptions and definitions of the variables are provided in Tables 1  and 2, respectively; Table 3 gives their summary statistics.
The first relevant finding of our analysis is that 20.42% of 1,009 positions are subject to partial credit rationing (i.e., the amount disbursed is below that requested by the borrower) and 15.36% to total credit rationing (the bank denies credit to the borrower) (Table 4) . Total credit rationing in our sample refers to those borrowers with a credit file at the bank (who have therefore passed the first stage of a loan application at the branch level) but have not yet obtained final approval at the board level. Borrowers rejected at the branch level are not included in the sample. Of further note is that what we call "partial credit rationing" is akin to but not identical to De Meza and Webb's (2006) well-known definition of Type I credit rationing: "At the ruling interest rate, borrowers may prefer larger loans than that offered by banks, although everyone willing to pay the market interest rate obtains some finance." Given that our sample comprises both partial and total credit rationing, the second part of their definition does not apply. Similarly, our "total credit rationing" is akin to but not identical to Stiglitz and Weiss's (1981) definition of Type II credit rationing: "Some applicants may be refused loans altogether, despite being willing to pay an interest rate above that charged to identical but fully funded borrowers." The difference in our study is that total credit rationing is affected by individual company characteristics, with the consequence that borrowers cannot be considered identical.
With regard to credit performance, sofferenze 11 represent only 0.2% of total credit positions (11 cases) and incagli account for an additional 0.59%. Although many loans are still outstanding, the result is interesting because the average proportion of nonperforming loans in the Italian banking system was approximately 4% in the same period, and Banca Etica's share of uncollateralized loans is much higher than the average. One of the main reasons for this is that most borrowers belong to secondlevel organizations (consorzi). A long-term relationship between a consorzi and a bank generates an implicit commitment by the former to intervene if the credit risk of one of its members increases, although consorzi do not provide any formal guarantee for the borrower. In a sense, this mechanism is a special case of relationship lending that gives Banca Etica the advantages of secured loans without incurring the cost of pledging collateral.
With regard to borrower characteristics, 79% of borrowers in our sample are microfirms (firms with fewer than 15 employees), 17% are small firms (from 16 to 50 employees), and only 3.7% are medium or large firms (more than 50 employees). If we consider borrower types, 43.5% are cooperatives (28.2% are social cooperatives and 15.3% traditional worker and consumer cooperatives or consortia) and 46.6% are 11. According to Italian financial regulations, a loan is classified as: (i) sofferenza when a formal restructuring process or bankruptcy procedure has been started and (ii) incaglio if no repayment (interest and/or principal) has been made for 180 days. Application of the Basel II rules in Italy by Bank of Italy establishes that a loan is under default if it is an incaglio or a sofferenza. Capital adequacy ratios are therefore calculated on the basis of this definition. A third classification of lower risk (sotto osservazione) is based on a discretionary evaluation by the bank; it is applied when the credit position is considered risky, with possible evolution to the two abovementioned default states.
TABLE 1 DESCRIPTIONS AND CONSTITUENTS OF VARIABLE CATEGORIES

Definitions
Cooperatives
Cooperatives differ from traditional for-profit firms in their goal of prevalente mutualità. This means that, unlike for-profit firms, cooperatives create benefits not under the prevailing form of profits for some of their stakeholders. The two main types of traditional cooperative are worker cooperatives (where workers are the dominant stakeholders and receive benefits in the form of safer working conditions and/or profits) and consumer cooperatives (where consumers are the dominant stakeholders and receive benefits in the form of lower prices and higher-quality goods). In exchange for a preferential tax regime for cooperatives, Italian law establishes that the payout from equity of cooperative members must be lower than that from short-term bonds.
Social cooperatives
Unlike traditional worker or consumer cooperatives, social cooperatives pursue the goal of providing a social service to beneficiaries other than their shareholders. According to Italian Law 381/1991, the goals of social cooperatives are social integration, community well-being, and general promotion of human welfare. There are two types of social cooperative: type A social cooperatives deliver health and education services, and type B social cooperatives operate in industry, agriculture, trade, or services with the goal of including "disadvantaged" workers (people with disabilities, former prisoners), who must make up at least 30% of the workforce.
Consortia
The distinguishing feature of a consortium or "second-level cooperative" is that its shareholders are not individuals but cooperatives. Consortia are generally created by cooperatives to achieve the economies of scale necessary to develop efficient services for all members. Associations Associations are formally organized private nonprofit organizations. Their field of action covers sport, environment, art, leisure, and professional life. Nonrecognized associations have a more flexible structure (they do not have to report detailed balance sheet data) but with some restrictions (they cannot inherit sums of money, etc.) compared with recognized ones. Onlus ONLUS are a special kind of association whose mission is to help people in need. They are regulated by Law 460/1997. Their most important characteristic is the preferential fiscal treatment (tax deductions and allowances) granted to those furnishing them with financial resources.
Cosigning agreements
By means of cosigning agreements, the bank guarantees to a third party (usually the government) that the NGO that benefits from specific government financing will use the money for the goal stated in the agreement. If this is not the case, the bank must repay the entire sum to the government. Cosigning agreements may or may not be covered by real and personal guarantees.
Constituents of variable types
Industry affiliation
Nonprofit, health services, recreation, other, agriculture, retail, high-tech. Financial services are the default omitted variable. Borrower's legal status Associations with legal personality, associations without legal personality, individual firms, religious entities, social cooperatives, limited liability companies, nonprofit organizations. Consumer and worker cooperatives are the default omitted variable. Credit position, type of borrower action Advances on receivables, purchase/restructuring of tangible assets, advances on contracts/projects, liquidity needs, cosigning on projects, advances on subsidies. Capital investment is the default omitted variable. Credit position, sector of operation International cooperation, domestic health and social welfare services, domestic cultural services, workers' recreation activities. Bio (or organic produce) is the default omitted variable. Note that the credit sector of operation does not necessarily coincide with the borrower's main sector of activity. Thirty-nine percent of credit positions included in the database were closed at the date of our inquiry; the remaining 61% are ongoing. With regard to credit motivation, as expressed by borrowers in credit records, the largest number of positions (37%) were required to satisfy liquidity needs and 15% were advance payments for borrowers' credit to third parties (a standard type is that of borrowers with receivables from the public administration at the national or local levels for the provision of a social service for which the payment has been deferred). The largest proportion of destination credit sectors pertains to the organic or biological produce industry (42%), followed by international cooperation, domestic health and social welfare, and domestic cultural activities. Forty-one percent of the loans were issued to members of second-level organizations, which were therefore part of larger networks. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on the interplay between the two types of credit rationing and various controls. With regard to partial credit rationing, we find marked deviations from the sample mean (which is around 20%) for nonsocial cooperatives (16%), advances on documents and contracts (14%), advances on subsidies (16%), credit positions of borrowers operating in health services (22%), borrowers located in central regions (26%), and borrowers with a relationship with board members (13%).
When we consider total credit rationing, the main deviations from the 15% sample mean concern borrowers working in not-for-profit industries (20%), in commercial industries (0%), or located in the south of Italy (23%), with previous loans defaulted or under scrutiny (sotto osservazione) (23%). Associations without legal status are subject to a larger proportion of total credit rationing (26%) as well. Pronounced deviations were also caused by cosigning on projects (29%) and advances on contracts (6%). Finally, we found an 89 basis point difference between the European Central Bank (ECB) refinancing rates for partially rationed (3.42) and nonrationed (2.53) borrowers and a 0.4 difference in terms of GDP growth in the quarters before the loan (Table 6 ). These latter findings show a positive correlation between the rationing decision and both variables. The econometric analysis developed in the section which follows will tell us whether the observed correlations are robust when controlling for concurring factors. 
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
Our sample consists of n firms. For each ith firm (i = 1 , . . . , N) we have information on the values assumed by a binary response (credit rationing) variable Y i and a vector of j covariates
T , (with j = 1 , . . . , M), where superscript, T, denotes vector transposition.
Binary data are often analyzed by means of a logistic model where the response variable is assumed to be Bernoulli distributed:
and the canonical parameter θ i = logit(p i ) has an identity link to the linear predictor
where p i = Pr{y i = 1}, α represents the overall intercept, and β is a vector of p regression parameters. The corresponding estimated model (Tables 7 and 8) is Table 1 for descriptions of variables. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. The calculation model is described in Section 3 (equation (2)). The dependent variable equals 1 if loans were either partially or totally rationed (in columns 1 and 2), if loans are partially rationed (in columns 3 and 4), if loans are totally rationed (in columns 5 and 6), and 0 otherwise. Totally rationed loans are excluded from columns 3 and 4 estimates and partially rationed in columns 5 and 6 estimates. a Likelihood-ratio test. The null hypothesis is lack of significant difference in the explanatory power of the unrestricted model (including the ECB refinancing rate regressor) and the restricted model (not including the ECB refinancing rate regressor). (1), the marginal effects are calculated as:
That is, the marginal effect identifies the slope for the unit i of the probability curve relating to the unitary changes of the regressor j (j = 1 , . . . , M) to Pr(y = 1|x), holding all other variables constant. In the case of dummy explanatory variables, the change in the probability of Pr(y = 1 | x), which results from changing the sth dummy from zero to one, holding all other variables at some fixed values, denoted by X * , is given by the difference: Pr(y = 1|x s = 1, X * ) -Pr(y = 1|x s = 0, X * ). For the definition of the dependent variables in the different estimates, see the legend to Table 7. where p i = Pr(y i = 1| x i ) = Pr(Rat = 1| x i ), and Rat i has a value of 1 if the size of the credit position provided by the lender was lower than that required by the borrower i = 1, . . . , N in time t = 1, . . . , T . The (N × M) matrix of regressors includes borrower or credit type characteristics and macroeconomic variables. We first consider the borrower's size, industry affiliation, legal status, type of borrower action, and the sector of operation (the constituent elements of each category are listed in Table 1 ), along with the borrower's geographical location, the total number of the borrower's outstanding loans, the borrower's group affiliation or affiliation to a consortium, the dummy assuming value if the loan was proposed and supported by one of the bank board members, and a dummy taking a value if the borrower at the moment of its request has a previous credit position classified as nonperforming (sofferenza), in distress (incaglio), or under scrutiny (sotto osservazione) 12 . Second, we include GDP growth in the previous quarter, unemployment and (consumer price index) inflation rates calculated by the OECD, plus the ECB refinancing rate.
13 More specifically, we are interested in testing a restriction of the model by which H 0 : β ECB = 0, where β ECB is the coefficient of the ECB refinancing rate. For this purpose, beyond the standard test of significance of the specific coefficient, we add to any relevant estimate a likelihood ratio (LR) test 14 for which the null hypothesis is the absence of a difference in the explanatory power of the unrestricted model (with the ECB variable) and the restricted model (without the ECB variable).
In choosing the methodological approach for our estimates, we had to take into account the complexity of the structure of our data and their peculiar time/space relationship. Our observation units are cross-sectional and at the credit position level, but there exist both a second level (borrowers who may have more than one loan with the bank) and a third level of aggregation (the year of the loan concession).
In a robustness check we took into account that partial and total rationing may be seen as two different phenomena. This is why, in addition to the estimated logit model for the rationed/nonrationed status (see Table 7 , columns 1 and 2), we performed two separate estimates for partial and total credit rationing. In the partial rationing model, the dependent variable is 1 if the amount of credit requested is only partially granted, and totally rationed firms are excluded from the sample (Table 7 , columns 3 and 4). In the total rationing model, the dependent variable has the value of 1 if credit is completely refused, and otherwise zero (see Table 7 , columns 5 and 6). We opted for the exclusion of cases of partial rationing in total rationing estimates. The alternative estimate from which partial cases are not excluded yields results substantially similar to those described in Section 3.3 and shown in Table A2 in the Appendix.
12. In this base estimate Rat i takes a value equal to 1 not only for totally denied credit but also for companies "only" partially rationed.
13. For the complete set of variables, see Tables 1 and 2. 14. The test is LR = 2 * (uL -rL), where uL and rL are, respectively, the log-likelihoods maximized with respect to unrestricted and restricted model parameters.
Finally, we estimated a multinomial logit model in which partial and total rationing are the dependent variables of the two-equation systems (Table 9 ). More formally, the response variable in the multinomial logit model assumes three specifications: 
where
. identifies the probability of arriving at a value k (for k = 0,1,2) for company i for the (partially, totally) rationed/nonrationed status and conditional upon the set of regressors specified in model (2). The alternative estimate, from which partial cases are not excluded, yields results substantially similar to those described in Section 3.3. With regard to the specification choices above, one may discuss whether the partial and total choices can be ranked or must be considered separately. However, the results from separate estimates seem to show that the two decisions derive from different policies. Total rationing is related more strongly to the borrower's individual characteristics, while decisions regarding partial rationing may also be conditioned by macroeconomic conditions affecting all borrowers in a given time period. For this reason, we chose the multinomial (instead of an ordered) logit approach. Finally, because we were interested not only in statistical but also in economic significance, for each model we calculated the magnitude of the impact of a unit change (marginal effect) of a given regressor on the probability that the dependent variable would have a value of 1 (Tables 8 and 10 ). 
Findings Regarding Variables at the Credit or Borrower Level
The first result was the strong significance of a borrower's past record. As expected, the existence of a nonperforming loan or of an incaglio or sotto osservazione position with the same bank significantly raised the probability of credit rationing. Hence, as already demonstrated in the literature (Cleary 1999) , some credit rationing is justified and is related to the credit risk evaluation of the borrower. If we consider the model discussed in Section 1, 17 the result is consistent with optimal nonprofit-maximizing bank behavior under the Basel constraint. From a quantitative point of view, we 15. Note that in the multinomial (in contrast to the ordered) logit model there is no ranking between the three different choices.
16. Full details on how the impact was calculated in the analysis are found in the legends to Tables 8  and 10. 17. Analytical details of the model are provided in an appendix available on the authors' websites. NOTES: qoq = quarterly rate of growth. See Table 1 for descriptions of variables. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. The estimated model is described in Section 3 (equation (3)). The variable Bad Credit Position is rescaled by 10 for derivative calculation. a Likelihood-ratio test. The null hypothesis is lack of significant difference in the explanatory power of the unrestricted model (including the ECB refinancing rate regressor in both equations of the system) and the restricted model (not including the ECB refinancing rate regressor in both equations of the system).
calculate that the existence of a bad loan position in the borrower's record with a lender raises the probability of credit rationing by 13.8% (Table 8) .
Upon investigating partial and total credit rationing separately, we found that only the latter is affected by a bad track record (the magnitude of the effect is 0.4% but significant; see Tables 9 and 10 ). The explanation for this result is that past nonperformance affects the borrower's creditworthiness and not the availability of credit. As a consequence, it leads to rejection of the borrower's request and not just to reduction of the loan.
With regard to industry affiliation dummies, we found (consistent with descriptive evidence provided in Table 5 ) that borrowers in the retail industry are significantly less rationed than the benchmark for financial services. In the multinomial logit estimate, the abovementioned effect for borrowers in the retail industry is explained by less total (but not partial) credit rationing.
With regard to loan types, we found that credit lines and bank cosigning agreements are subject to significantly more credit rationing than the omitted type of advances on contracts. Here again, the entire effect is to be attributed to total credit rationing choices.
Another interesting finding is that microfirms (firms with fewer than 15 employees) are significantly less rationed than the benchmark (firms 16 to 50 employees). Both separate partial and total and multinomial logit results highlight that this is mainly a partial rationing phenomenon. The explanation may be twofold. First, microfirms ask for small credit quantities and are therefore less likely to receive a lower amount than requested.
Second, higher firing costs arising from the application of Italian law (Law 300/1975) expose small firms (but not microfirms) to greater risk and make them more sensitive to the business cycle. The law establishes that workers fired from firms with more than 15 employees must be reinstated if a judge concludes that they have been fired without giusta causa (i.e., on fair grounds). The "fair grounds" rule cannot be applied to workers fired from firms with fewer than 15 employees.
With regard to geographical location, we observed that borrowers located in the central regions of Italy had a much higher probability of experiencing (partial) credit rationing. It should be remembered that many of the Banca Etica's borrowers located in the center of the country receive contracts for work from public administration authorities. A likely interpretation is that the liquidity risk of these borrowers (delays in payment from the government and risks that not all receivables are acknowledged by the government itself) induces the bank to reduce the amount of credit.
The somewhat surprising result here is the absence of significant effects of location in the Italian Mezzogiorno (southern Italy) on credit rationing, because nearly all previous empirical studies on credit rationing in Italy have shown borrowers located in the south of Italy to be rationed to a greater degree. To understand the scenario of financial intermediation in the south of Italy, it is necessary to note that several mergers and acquisitions in the Italian banking system during the 1990s transferred ownership of overindebted banks in the south in large part to banks in the north. Empirical studies of the effects of this change have documented that bank concentration has improved bank performance (Focarelli et al. 2002) in the area. Parallel to this, some authors have complained that the process has also generated a loss of local information and reduced the credit issued to local firms, as shown by the dramatic drop in the total volume of financed investment in the area (Mattesini and Messori 2004) . These considerations help explain why location in the south is significant (and negative) in the credit rationing estimate for the 1998-2000 period but not for the 1989-1991 period (Bagella, Becchetti, and Caggese 2001) . The anomaly of our finding in this framework is, however, consistent with Banca Etica's policy: an explicit social goal of this policy is to promote credit in the south. Indeed, the bank is one of the few for which credits are higher than deposits from the Mezzogiorno.
Finally, the number of preexisting loans with other banks and loan durations are all significantly and negatively correlated with the dependent variable. These final two findings may seem odd, but are perfectly reasonable if we interpret them together with the effect of the previous loan risk classification dummy. Net of the borrower loan risk identified by the bank, the presence of multiple loans is a proxy for creditworthiness, 18 and as such should be negatively correlated with credit rationing. However, the same variable also indicates that Banca Etica may have a lower probability of being a senior creditor in bankruptcy procedures and therefore should have an opposite (positive) effect on credit rationing. 19 Our findings indicate that the first effect prevails.
The partial and total separate estimates and the multinomial logit estimate show that the loan duration effect exists only for total credit rationing, while the multiple borrowing effect does so only for partial credit rationing. The negative relationship 18. Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) argue that multiple banking reduces the probability of credit rationing. Von Thadden (1995) finds that a higher number of lenders reduces banking rent extraction.
19. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) argue that multiple banking may make debt renegotiation more difficult, and Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that the passage from single to multiple borrowing increases the cost of credit and reduces its availability. Table 8 , where Pr(y = k|x) now identifies the probability of observing for firm i the value k (for k = 0,1,2) for the obtained credit, conditioned by the set of regressors.
between duration and total credit rationing may depend on the fact that banks gain more from long-term loans, while borrowers have a longer time horizon to repay the debt. For this reason it is less likely that the bank will reject every opportunity to issue credit to long-term borrowers. This effect may prevail over the risk effect of the prolonged debt condition of the borrower, considering that many borrowers' risk dimensions are already captured by other variables described earlier (such as bad credit track record, industry type, and size).
Findings Regarding Macroeconomic Variables
Among macroeconomic findings, inflation is negative and significant, in line with its effect of reducing the real value of loans. A plausible explanation for the positive effect of GDP on partial rationing is that GDP growth causes excess demand (the increase in the demand for funds is higher than bank capacity to accommodate it). 20 20. In the short run, if the increase in the demand for funds is perceived as temporary, the bank may decide not to invest to increase personnel and branches, thereby remaining constrained in satisfying the additional demand.
Such an effect can be expected to have an impact on the improvement of borrower balance sheets, which in turn should reduce credit rationing. The ECB refinancing rate is strongly positive and significant, supporting the credit view hypothesis. The relevance of this coefficient is confirmed by the LR test rejecting the null of the lack of difference in explanatory power between the unrestricted specification (with the ECB variable) and the restricted one (without the ECB variable). Considering that we have quarterly data on the refinancing rate, this finding is not based on a mere few observations of the macroeconomic variable.
From a quantitative point of view, we observed that doubling the ECB refinancing rate from its mean value raises the probability of partial credit rationing by 19%, whereas doubling the inflation rate lowers it by 29% (Table 10 ). Note also that the multinomial logit estimate indicates that the two macroeconomic variables affect partial but not total rationing (the marginal effects rise to 16.5% and 27%, respectively, when we consider only partial credit rationing in Table 10 ). This result is confirmed in separate partial and total credit rationing estimates and in the multinomial logit two-equation estimate. The finding related to the ECB rate is consistent with the hypothesis that this indicator affects the total volume of commercial bank loans but not the creditworthiness of the individual borrower.
We may interpret our evidence on the credit view in light of the four rationales provided in the introduction (effect of credit tightening on financed investment risk, credit borrower risk, bank interest margin, and bank's capital adequacy ratios). If we plot the ECB refinancing rate against the bank interest margin, we find no evidence of a significant positive correlation (the correlation coefficient is 0.13). The bank's capital adequacy ratio across the sample years also exhibits very limited variability and has no correlation with the ECB refinancing rate. The explanation for the bank's behavior is therefore more likely to be related to rationales one and two (the adverse selection and balance sheet effects). However, the poor reliability of balance sheet data for firms of this kind and the insufficient tracking of them in bank records prevent us from testing whether the worsening of the overall financial position of the borrowers may account for the observed credit view effect. However, a reasonable explanation of why partial credit rationing tends to be higher in the presence of a higher ECB refinancing rate is that the lender anticipates that higher interest rates will worsen the borrower's financial position both directly, through a higher interest rate on the debt, and indirectly, through lower solvency of the borrower's customers, such as a public administration, which may further delay due payments and thereby increase the riskiness of loans that anticipate payment for borrower receivables.
In interpreting the effect of the ECB refinancing rate coefficient, we also excluded some observationally equivalent rationales that are not related to the credit view. First, an alternative plausible explanation is that if monetary policy operates with a lag, high interest rates may indicate a booming real economy and therefore an excess demand for loans. However, examining the pairwise correlation between the ECB rate and GDP growth, we find that the latter is very low (0.11%) and thus not significant. Second, with high interest rates, demand for Banca Etica's loans may be higher because of its lower rates. However, we find no evidence of a positive correlation between Banca Etica's loan volume and the ECB refinancing rate (the pairwise correlation coefficient is 0.18 and is therefore not significant).
Robustness Check
As is well known, standard deviations are influenced by clustering approaches, while coefficient magnitudes remain the same. In particular, our choice of company and year clusters in the baseline models (Tables 7 and 9) tends to increase standard errors (and reduce significance) with respect to the alternative of considering either the company or the year clusters alone. In Table A1 in the Appendix we show the robustness of the significance of the ECB variable in relation to the abovementioned clustering approaches.
A second choice was to rule out partial rationing cases when estimating determinants of total rationing (Table 7 , columns 5 and 6). In an additional robustness check we show what happens when partial rationing cases are not excluded (see Table A2 ), thus documenting that our results are substantially unchanged and explaining the lack of significance of the ECB variable among determinants of total rationing.
CONCLUSIONS
The empirical literature on credit rationing and credit view consists of a large number of studies, but almost none has been based directly on official bank records that include evidence on rationing decisions. Such information can help resolve the typical problems of observational equivalence and interview bias that arise in surveyand balance sheet-based studies of credit rationing, as well as identification problems in credit view empirical analyses.
Furthermore, none of the previous contributions in these two fields has investigated the behavior of nonprofit-maximizing banks. Besides the interesting features specific to banks of this type, we argue that an important share of their typical borrowers (generally very small not-for-profit organizations and associations) are productive units with the lowest level of substitutability between loans and alternative forms of financing (i.e., bond issues) and are therefore likely to be more strongly affected by credit view mechanisms. Finally, beyond this specificity (relatively underresearched in the literature despite its market relevance), an important element of generality is the similarity between commercial and nonprofit-maximizing banks in terms of credit rationing and attitude toward risk.
Our findings show that a significant number of bank borrowers experience partial and total credit rationing. The most important factors affecting credit rationing are a record of nonperformance in the past, the borrower's type and legal status, multiple lending relationships, and loan size.
Among macroeconomic variables we find a significant and positive (negative) effect of the ECB refinancing rate (i.e., the inflation rate) on partial (but not total) credit rationing. The former is consistent with the credit view hypothesis, the latter with the reduced real value of borrower debt under inflation. In this respect, our study has highlighted a previously unexplored facet of the effects of credit tightening policies: a balance sheet credit view effect on not-for-profit organizations, cooperatives, and social enterprises.
Closer examination of the possible explanations for our credit view finding has led us to exclude the notion of dependency on a bank balance sheet effect (i.e., the idea that capital adequacy ratios and the bank intermediation margin correlate with the ECB policy rate). We therefore argue that a borrower's balance sheet effect is at work. This effect may operate both directly (the borrower's debt position is worsened) and indirectly (the debt position of the borrower's customers is worsened, causing an additional risk of deferred payments). LITERATURE CITED
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